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1 Introduction 
There is a broad consensus among the international community that building a 
functional state is one of the most critical concerns for today’s Sub-Saharan Africa.1  
On one hand, researchers as well as practitioners agree that the dysfunctional state (or 
state failure) has brought about political insecurity and serious armed conflicts (Holsti 
1996; Rotberg 2004; Zartman 1995). Therefore, donors regard state-building as “the 
central objective” in their assistance to overcome fragile situations (OECD 2007). On 
the other hand, against the backdrop of severe criticism against the “Washington 
Consensus,” the role of the state in economic development has been widely recognized 
since the 1990s. This is the reason why the international financial institutions have 
emphasized the importance of good governance for economic development (World 
Bank 1989, 1993, 2001). Projects of state-building in Africa have attracted wide 
 attention, exactly because Africa’s predicaments including civil wars and economic 
crises have been often attributed to the dysfunctional states.  
According to recent arguments, a functional state is supposed to be based on a 
constructive state-society relation (OECD 2007, 2011). The primary role of the state is 
considered to be the provision of basic services, of which the maintenance of social 
order is the most important one; the service provisions will determine popular attitudes 
towards the state. In response to the positive (or negative) attitude of the society, the 
state may (or may not) change behaviors. If the state is responsive enough to change its 
behaviors in taking popular aspirations into account, the state-society relation is 
regarded as constructive, and the process of state-building will be stable in the long run.  
If we problematize African states and seek a constructive state-society 
relationship, it is indispensable to look back at their historical trajectories and 
understand how the present states as well as the state-society relationship have been 
formed. On this point, one of the most salient features of the African states is their 
exogenous origin. Besides a few exceptions, the origins of current African states can be 
found in the arbitrary territorial demarcations by European colonial forces. For many of 
them, the Berlin Conference held in 1884-85 was the decisive point for starting their 
state-building. Since the imposition by the external powers at the beginning of the 
 colonial period, African states have struggled to control territories as well as to 
incorporate society.  
These efforts have been clearly reflected in the state policies as well as practices 
with regard to land. Controlling land is by definition inseparable from controlling 
territory. Moreover, land has close relations with the society, as it is indispensable for 
people’s living. This is particularly true in agrarian societies like those in Africa, where 
the overwhelming majority of people have critically depended on land for their 
subsistence. Attempts to control these societies have been, therefore, directly reflected 
in land policies.  
In focusing on land policies, this chapter attempts to shed light on changes in 
and continuities of state-society relations and examines the challenges of state-building 
in Africa. This chapter begins by tracing a history of state intervention on land as well 
as societal reactions against it from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial period. After 
presenting a rough picture of the historical development of state intervention in land, the 
chapter focuses on the case of Rwanda. As a country that has actively taken policies 
securing land tenure, Rwanda tends to be regarded as a showcase for land tenure reform, 
but detailed examinations on socio-political backgrounds reveal serious challenges for 
policy objectives. 
  
2 State and land in pre-colonial Africa 
In comparison with pre-modern Europe and Japan, land played quite a different role in 
pre-colonial African states. In the former regions, political domination was deeply 
connected with the control of land, on which intensive agriculture flourished in densely 
populated areas. Land was the basis of state-building, because the national revenue 
depended heavily on agriculture. The relationship between political authority and land 
was considerably different in pre-colonial Africa. The difference was clearly indicated 
in the proportion of land to population. In Africa, the population was extremely scarce 
and land was highly abundant. In 1750, when Japan had 78.3 persons per square 
kilometer, Europe had 26.9 persons per kilometer, and China had 22.2 persons per 
square kilometer, Africa had only 2.7 persons per square kilometer (Herbst 2000, 16). 
This implied the easy availability of land in Africa and, therefore, frequent changes of 
residence. These conditions greatly affected the meaning of territorial domination. 
Controlling land was not crucial for establishing political authority in cases where 
inhabitants could easily flee whenever they were not satisfied with their ruler.  
Another important feature was the weight of kinship. While pre-colonial Africa was 
overwhelmingly rural and agrarian like other pre-modern societies, its conspicuous 
 feature was a predominance of the principle of kinship. Lineage networks based on 
familial ties were by far the most important compared with other networks, such as 
clientship, existing in pre-colonial Africa (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1982, 67). The weight of 
familial ties logically implied the substantial autonomy of rural communities vis-à-vis 
the state. In addition, the level of technologies available for political authorities also 
constrained their territorial control. Rulers in pre-colonial Africa were extremely short 
of infrastructure to broadcast power. When Fanti leaders in what is now Ghana 
approved the so-called Mankessim Constitution to formalize their Confederation in 
1871, one of its primary goals was “to make good and substantial roads” (Herbst 2000, 
42).  
In sum, African pre-colonial states lacked the capability to formally establish control 
over a large territory beyond the center of the polity. Their territory was generally small, 
as shown, for example, in pre-colonial kingdoms in the Great Lakes region, two of 
which later became Rwanda and Burundi (Ogot 1984). Even in cases where the claimed 
territories were considerably large, like the empire of Mali or Songhay, their ability to 
extract resources under ruled areas was deemed quite limited, as the state revenue 
depended mainly on the long distance trade rather than agriculture (Cissoko 1984). It 
was on this basis that Coquery-Vidrovitch (1969, 77) pointed out, in arguing about the 
 “African mode of production,” the “absence of a true despotism aiming at a direct 
exploitation of the peasant class”. Although judging whether African pre-colonial states 
had constructive state-society relations or not is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is 
safe to say that, in comparison with states in later periods, they had only limited 
capabilities to seize and extract resources from the society, thereby leaving the latter 
ample room for autonomy. 
 
3 Land in African colonial states 
African colonial state and its change  
In his seminal work, Crawford Young divided the colonial period into two stages 
according to the nature of African colonial states. The first was the period of 
constructing “Bula Matari.” Translated as “breaker of rocks,” Bula Matari was 
originally a nickname for Henry Morton Stanley, an American explorer who brought to 
light the whole course of the Congo River and, in collaboration with the ambitious 
Belgian king Leopold II, opened the way to the establishment of the Congo Free State. 
While the nickname spread over the regions through which Stanley passed, Bula Matari 
subsequently came to represent the newly established Congo Free State, with 
connotations of the intrusive, alien, crushing, and ruthless nature of its rule (Young 1994, 
 1).  
Following the conquest of the African continent in the relatively short period 
between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, European 
powers set up, in a haste, a shape of the state, with special emphasis on building 
hegemony and ensuring fiscal self-sufficiency. After crushing African resistances, 
systems for collecting the revenue through the head tax, requisitioning labor, and 
punishing those who refused to obey were quickly installed. As the metaphor of Bula 
Matari described, the rule was harsh and oppressive.  
The end of the First World War marked the second stage of the colonial rule in 
Africa. Being armed with more effective administration and more sophisticated 
ideology than those in the previous period, the colonial state in this stage came to be 
rationalized and routinized. An important change, in this context, was that an idea of 
“development” appeared in the doctrine of the colonial state (Young 1994, 150). 
Although the independence of African colonies was out of the question for European 
countries at this stage, the principle of promoting the “well-being and development” of 
indigenous peoples came to be gradually accepted as an international norm following 
the conclusion of the Covenant of the League of Nations.2 Development was also 
promoted from the viewpoint of fiscal self-sufficiency, as it would contribute to the state 
 revenue. In this context, African farmers were considered as main actors for 
development, and their cash crop production was enhanced by the colonial authorities, 
though white farmers hampered it in the settler colonies such as South Africa and Kenya 
for fear of the competition (Mosley 1983).  
 
Land Policy under the colonial state 
The evolution of land policy reflected the above-mentioned metamorphosis of African 
colonial states. During the period of Bula Matari, the land policy was characterized by 
despoliation, through which vast lands were transferred from Africans to the colonial 
states, white settlers, and private chartered companies. In the settler colonies, the 
systematic appropriation of land started in the very early stage. In the colony of Natal, 
which was proclaimed a British colony in 1843, the colonial government forced 
Africans to dwell in the native “locations” (i.e., reserves). By 1864, there were forty-two 
locations with 2 million acres out of the total colonial area of 12.5 million acres. Legally, 
the rest of the colony was either owned by Whites or held by the government as 
unassigned Crown lands (Thompson 1990, 97). In those days, Africans numbered at the 
lowest reckoning more than three hundred thousand, while the Europeans, who 
numbered less than twenty thousand, owned most of the best land (de Kiewiet 1937, 
 188). It was in fact a clear precursor of the notorious Native Land Act in 1913, by which 
all Africans were obliged to reside in the reserves accounting for only 7% of the total 
national territory. In the case of Kenya, although it was in the inter-war period that the 
number of European immigrants to the so-called White Highlands markedly increased3, 
huge tracts of lands had been alienated under the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 for 
leases of ninety-nine years (Meek 1968, 79). 
While the number of European settlers was limited in the French and Belgian 
colonies, the spoliation of land was also severe and systematic. The concept of “vacant 
lands without owner” (“terres vacantes et sans maître”) was utilized for this purpose. 
The model of this policy could be found in the Congo Free State. The Ordinance of 1st 
July 1885, which was promulgated just after the creation of the country, claimed all 
“vacant” lands to be the property of the state. Due to this Ordinance, the overwhelming 
part of the territory was formally transferred to the hand of the colonial government, and 
then granted to chartered companies for concession. The same system was adopted in 
the French Equatorial Africa. At the end of the 19th century, almost all the territory of 
the French Congo (present Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Central African Republic) 
was divided among 40 big concession companies (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1972). While 
French West Africa did not see such a massive transfer of land through concession 
 companies, it was due to the resistance mounted by French merchants, who had already 
developed their own activities and feared the entry of rival companies into the market.  
Since the inter-war period, on a parallel with the change of colonial policy in 
general, the protection of African land rights came to be emphasized under the 
“indigenous policy”. Although arguments for the protection of African rights as well as 
criticism against the massive land spoliation had not been unknown,4 the inter-war 
period saw a systematic change in colonial land policies, in recognizing and formalizing 
customary laws for managing lands in rural areas.  
In French colonies, the move was accelerated due to the total failure of the 
previous development policy depending heavily on chartered companies. The concept 
of “vacant land” was abandoned, and attempts were made to activate African customary 
laws by codifying them. For instance, three volumes of customary codes (“les grands 
coutumiers”) were published in French West Africa (Comité d'études historiques et 
scientifiques de l'Afrique occidentale française 1939). In British colonies, customary 
powers were institutionalized in the colonial governance system. The Native Authorities 
were organized as a body representing traditional indigenous authorities, and they were 
officially allowed to exercise a wide range of customary powers (Hailey, 1957, 414). In 
this system of “indirect rule,” traditional chiefs were considered to be indispensable 
 elements for the social stability of colonies. They had often to be “found” or “created” 
in some African societies that did not have a centralized political structure. The policy 
implied that African “tribes” were supposed to be in an organized state, each with its 
own territory, customs, and leadership (Mamdani 1996, 81). Although customary laws 
were not codified in the British colonies, the chiefs’ judgments were respected and 
backed by the colonial authority, thus considerably reinforcing their personal power in 
comparison with the pre-colonial period. That was the reason why Mamdani (1996) 
called the system “decentralized despotism.” 
 
State control over society 
Two characteristics can be identified with regard to the state-society relationship in the 
colonial period. Coercion and oppression were the first feature. Following the conquest, 
it was imperative for the colonial state to control the African societies and bring order. 
For this reason, a coercive system to provide security and to extract resources was 
rapidly established. The extraction heavily depended on a flat-rate poll tax (or hut tax) 
and labor requisition, particularly in the early stage of the colonial period. The Bula 
Matari had the capability to seize individual Africans and force them into paying taxes 
and providing labor. In this context, Africans were deprived of enormous amounts of 
 land by force as well as by law. However, unlike pre-capitalist Europe and Japan, where 
the land tax or tributes of agricultural products was a critical component of the state 
revenue, colonial authorities in Africa could not directly rob African farmers of their 
agricultural products. The introduction of a land tax was impossible in a society, where 
the overwhelming majority of people depended on shifting cultivation.  
Secondly, the state-society relationship was indirect and multiple. The colonial 
state established the relationship with African societies through the intermediation of 
“tribes”. Under the indirect rule, “tribes” were indispensable means of territorial 
administration and were reorganized for this purpose. As typically shown in the Native 
Authorities in British colonies, African chiefs were institutionalized within the colonial 
governance, and were delegated considerable power from the colonial state. Their 
function was similar to “agencies for the provision of what are usually described as 
Local Government services” (Hailey 1957, 416). On the assumption that the group 
shared a common custom, chiefs of the “agencies” were provided with not only political 
but also administrative and judicial power over members. The legal pluralism thus 
became a prerequisite for the system5 because, in addition to the statutory law, each 
“tribe” or the Native Authority was provided with its own customary law.  
It is also important to note that, as agencies for the local government services, 
 “tribes” were strictly connected to a territory. The colonial authority delegated the 
power to each Native Authority to rule over a defined territory. The territory had to be 
clear for the agencies to control people through such activities as communicating 
administrative orders, providing technical services, adjudicating conflicts, and so on. 
The Native Authorities, therefore, connected “tribes” to clearly defined territories, of 
which people was severely constrained from leaving. As a consequence of the indirect 
rule, the territorial adherence of each ethnic group was considerably reinforced and the 
ethnic difference came to be inevitably emphasized (Feder and Noronha 1987). 
 
4 Post-colonial African states and land 
Post-colonial African states 
Independence did not automatically establish constructive state-society relationships in 
Africa. Rather, post-colonial African states have attracted attention because of the 
predicaments they face. In other words, Africa’s recent difficulties, such as civil wars 
and economic crises, have been regarded as the results of the state dysfunction 
(Sandbrook 1985, Bayart 1993). The arguments can be roughly distinguished into two 
groups. On the one hand, scholars focused on a sharp contrast between “the empirical 
and the juridical in statehood” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982a). The independence of 
 African countries could be attributed to the change of international norms rather than to 
maturity with regard to political economy as the sovereign state.6 The emergence of the 
“quasi-states” (Jackson 1990) was an inevitable consequence of the mass-production of 
sovereign states. On the other hand, the nature of state governance has particularly 
attracted academic interest. In this context, the personal and patrimonial characters of 
governance under the one-party rule have been pointed out (Jackson and Rosberg 
1982b: Médard 1982; Chabal and Daloz 1999). These studies stress the continuity of the 
nature of the state-society relationship in post-colonial African states with those in the 
pre-colonial and the colonial period. 
Although the historical continuity has been an important feature characterizing 
post-colonial African states, huge impacts that the end of the Cold War had on their 
nature should not be ignored. During the Cold War era, the oppressive and patrimonial 
nature of African states was tacitly endorsed and protected by the major international 
powers, as both the Western and the Eastern blocs supported these problematic African 
countries in favor of their allied politics. While the superpowers were quite eager to 
hold their allied countries in their own camps, tacit permission was given to the dubious 
nature of African states. The end of the Cold War induced drastic changes in the attitude 
of the Western countries. As the Eastern bloc disappeared, the West had no need to take 
 the Cold War logics into account. Consequently, they instead put forward a new demand 
for democratization for African countries, which were as a condition of official 
development assistance. The demand produced dramatic effects on African countries, 
suffering from serious financial shortage because of protracted economic crises. 
Although the influence of African social movements for democratization should not be 
underestimated, it seems safe to say that the conditionality of aid was the main reason 
why the number of one-party states, which had accounted for two-thirds of all African 
countries at the end of the 1980s, rapidly decreased and finally disappeared in a few 
years (Clapham 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997).  
Needless to say, the abolition of one-party rule did not automatically result in 
democratization in the true sense of the word. In fact, Africa saw, in the 1990s, the 
spread of democratic institutions and the frequent outbreak of serious armed conflicts at 
the same time (Takeuchi 2007). In quite a few among the countries introducing 
democratic systems, democracy has been fictitious, in the sense that a number of 
devices invalidating civil liberties have been maintained for the sake of rulers. However, 
it is also true that there are countries that have positively transformed the state-society 
relationship in the same period; Ghana and Benin have successfully promoted 
democracy to date. The end of the Cold War has clearly activated contentious politics in 
 Africa (Tarrow and Tilly 2007).  
 
Land policy until the 1980s 
While newly independent African countries adopted a variety of land policies, common 
features were observable among them: the state hegemony over land was legally intact, 
or even strengthened, after independence. From the legal point of view, lands in African 
colonies could be categorized into three types: 1) registered lands ensuring private 
property rights mainly for white settlers, 2) national lands, over which the colonial state 
had assumed full and direct authority for the disposition, and 3) customary lands, over 
which reorganized indigenous institutions such as the Native Authorities were delegated 
the power to control. In settler colonies and South Africa,7 a relatively small number of 
settlers occupied vast areas under their private property rights. For many of the newly 
independent African countries, however, the establishment of private property rights 
was not the policy priority. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, although lawmakers adopted 
a new land law in 1963, which aimed at promoting the establishment of private property 
rights, the president F. Houphouët-Boigny relied on his prerogatives to suspend the 
promulgation (Ley 1972, 28). African leaders were generally not eager to rapidly 
introduce private property rights over customary lands, for fear that it would provoke 
 social confusion. 
The reasons why post-colonial states strengthened their legal control over land 
were multiple. Firstly, the scope of the state control was enlarged due to the effect of 
independence. In Burundi, customary lands were simply incorporated into the national 
land just before independence (Kolhagen 2010), thereby providing the state with the 
role of trustee of customary lands. Secondly, the resource nationalism had a significant 
impact particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. The background of the former Zairian land 
law in 1973 was that the state had the supreme right over the whole national territory as 
well as the underground mineral resources. Thirdly, the socialist ideology contributed to 
reinforcing national control over land. Not only the Marxist-Leninist countries like 
Angola and Ethiopia, but also African socialist regimes like Tanzania, fiercely opposed 
the promotion of private property rights, which were supposed to exacerbate the 
economic gap among nationals.  
New African states actively intervened in rural societies under the banner of 
modernization and development, though the results tended to be disappointing. Socialist 
countries were particularly eager to modernize rural areas. Adopting African socialism 
under J. Nyerere, Tanzania undertook endeavors to promote rural development. 
Following the Arusha Declaration in 1967, considerable efforts were made for 
 villagization. The construction of Ujamaa villages was regarded as the first step to 
achieve the African socialism. This stage should be succeeded by the formation of 
collective farms, which finally ought to be the sole agricultural production unit (Nyerere 
1968). In reality, however, the construction of collective farms was confronted with 
strong resistance, and was officially abandoned in the 1980s. Mozambique was another 
country which sought to implement a radical policy of rural development. In this 
Marxist-Leninist country, the program of voluntary agricultural collectivization was an 
important pillar of the socialist policy. The aim of the program has been to gather the 
dispersed rural population into centralized settlements – known as “communal villages” 
– and to increase productivity through state farms and cooperatives. Despite advances in 
the areas of health, education, habitation, and poplar political participation, the strategy 
could not achieve economic success. State farms as well as cooperatives performed 
poorly, thus leading to the serious decline of agricultural production. Within eight years 
after independence, the government was obliged to abandon the state-centered rural 
development strategy (Roesch 1984).  
Some countries initiated land redistribution policies at the early stage after 
independence, though the consequences were rather ambiguous. Kenya was one of such 
country. Following the negotiation for independence, the government purchased 
 large-scale farms from white farmers willing to sell their properties to redistribute them 
to African small farmers. The resettlement schemes were implemented mainly from the 
1960s to the 70s, and more than 66,000 African families became beneficiaries (Abrams 
1979: 19). However, the redistributed areas were only a limited part of the former white 
farms, of which the majority was transferred to Africans without being dismantled or 
remained intact in the hands of Europeans (Leys 1974). While the resettlement has 
arguably contributed to the growth of agricultural production (Green 1987), it brought 
about antagonism between settlers and original inhabitants, as many agriculturalist 
Kikuyu gained the lands and settled in the pastoralist Kalenjin area (see Chapter 6).8 
Ethiopia was another country adopting radical policy reforms. The socialist 
revolution in 1974 caused considerable changes in rural society. The overlord system 
was dismantled and their properties were nationalized; the lands were redistributed to 
small-scale farmers and landless people; and rural modernization policies including 
villagization and resettlement programs were implemented. The consequences of the 
radical land reform in the 1970s were, however, disappointing. The general assessment 
was that the reform had little or no effects on the improvement of productivity. 
Moreover, it did not change the basic attitude of the Ethiopian state towards rural 
society, in the sense that “a command and control approach continues to dominate 
 agricultural policy” (Abegaz 2004, 321). Although traditional leaders were eliminated in 
the course of the revolution, the hierarchical state-society relations were generally 
maintained, as they were only replaced by young party cadres under the socialist regime 
(Clapham 1988).  
After independence, African post-colonial states strengthened the legal control 
over land, and actively intervened in rural communities. This often resulted in marked 
changes in rural landscapes. However, with regard to state-society relations, 
independent African states had a clear continuity with their precursors, as they 
maintained hegemonic control over society. Even if the states were able to impose 
policies and change the landscape, they did not succeed in getting the expected results 
of increasing agricultural productivity. In stark contrast to Asian countries with the 
experience of the “green revolution,” African agriculture has suffered from continuous 
stagnation. Also, the states did not succeed in extracting resources directly from 
agricultural producers. In abolishing the poll tax and labor requisition,9 post-colonial 
African states reduced their capacity to take resources out of rural society. According to 
G. Hyden’s well-known term, the state in Africa failed in “capturing” its peasants 
(Hyden 1980). 
 
 Land policies and land problems after the 1990s 
Since the end of the Cold War, many African countries have launched land reform. 
Factors contributing to the wave of land reform are multiple.10 Political changes were 
the most important driving force. In former settler colonies in Southern Africa, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia gained independence in 1980 and 1989, respectively, and the 
African National Congress took power in 1994 in South Africa and abolished Apartheid. 
Land reform was one of the top priorities for these countries. Considering grave social 
injustice due to the massive land appropriation by white settlers and colonial authorities, 
it was quite natural that the newly established African-led governments stressed the 
importance of land reform.  
With regard to the land distribution progamme, many countries have adopted 
the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle, under which property rights of white 
settlers are ensured and only the area that was “willingly” sold can be redistributed to 
Africans. While the principle has contributed to preventing the drastic outflow of white 
farmers and social confusion, it has made the progress of the land reforms extremely 
slow, thus making their fruits intangible for the majority of the citizens. It was mainly 
for this reason that Zimbabwe abandoned the principle and adopted a more radical 
method of land redistribution (Fast Track Land Reform Programme) in the late 1990s.11 
 Assessments of the policy change have been highly controversial as well as polarized. 
Supporters have praised its effects on activating small scale African farmers, while 
opponents have emphasized the incidental violence against white farmers and nepotism 
regarding the land acquisition (Cliffe et al. 2011; Pilossof 2012). The “willing buyer, 
willing seller” principle has been severely criticized also in South Africa, in which the 
prevailing opinion has been that the land reform has failed in producing expected results 
(James 2007; Republic of South Africa 2012).  
Although it is understandable that the Southern African governments have been 
quite eager to obtain tangible results from the reform, the land redistribution tends to 
always be controversial. In addition to the simple fact that transforming a 
socio-economic distortion that has been formed since the colonization requires a long 
time, the policy assessment itself may be problematic. As the land redistribution may 
affect social values relating to land in various ways, policy assessments are likely to be 
polarized according to political stances with regard to which value should be prioritized. 
In South Africa, serious debates have continued between those who aim at restoring 
social identity and social justice through the land distribution and those who prioritize 
economic efficiency and agricultural development (Leyshon 2009).  
Southern African countries are not the only place where land reform policies 
 have been implemented. Land tenure reforms without land redistribution have been 
actively carried out in Africa since the 1990s, as more than 20 countries have revised or 
newly enacted land laws for this purpose (Alden-Wily 2003). As mentioned above, 
political liberalization in the same period has formed an important background to this 
trend. In addition, an ideological change in land and property rights should be pointed 
out. Through influential studies like those by North (1981) and de Soto (1989), the key 
role of property rights for economic development has been widely recognized. In this 
context, against the backdrop of a broad consensus on the importance of customary land 
rights and that of state intervention for their protection (Ostrom 1990; Platteau 1996), 
recent land laws tend to officially recognize and protect customary land rights, though 
the concrete measures taken have considerably varied (Deininger and Binswanger 2001; 
Alden-Wily 2011). For instance, Tanzania enacted in 1999 the Village Land Act, which 
was characterized by the cardinal decentralization of land administration. The law 
designated the Village Council, a local body composed of 25 elected adult members of a 
village, as a land manager in charge of tasks including managing lands in accordance 
with the customary law of the area, issuing certificates of customary title, and 
adjudicating land disputes among villagers. The Tanzanian law has been positively 
assessed as supportive for ensuring common property rights (Alden-Wily 2011). 
 The recent wave of land (tenure) reforms, aiming at ensuring small farmers’ 
land rights, has been generated in the context of democratization as well as increasing 
land shortages due to various reasons including rapid population increase.12 Can the 
policies provide land tenure security for the majority of rural inhabitants? Can they 
consequently promote economic development, as theorists of new institutional 
economics advocate? Considering the short period since the implementation of new 
land laws, it may be too early to assess the results of recent land tenure reforms. For a 
better understanding of the attempts as well as their challenges, an in-depth case study 
would be helpful.13 In the next section, recent land policies in Rwanda and their 
background are analyzed. Rwanda has made serious efforts towards the systematic land 
registration for several years, and will complete the provision of land certificates for all 
over its territory. We will explore the background of this first experience in Africa and 
examine its effects and challenges. 
 
5 Rwanda’s post-conflict state-building and land 
Rwanda is a tiny country in Central Africa. With 10 million people living in an area 
smaller than Belgium, it is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. The 
population is composed of three ethnic groups: the Hutu comprises the overwhelming 
 majority (more than 80%), while the Tutsi is a minority, and the Twa is an extremely 
small group of hunter-gatherers comprising around 1%. The three groups share a 
language (kinyarwanda) and a religions (Christian and Islam), and live in mixture in the 
hilly country. While the distinction of and hierarchical relations among the groups can 
be traced back to the pre-colonial period, they were formalized and considerably 
strengthened as a consequence of the colonial administration,14 thereby provoking 
resentment among the discriminated majority, Hutu, and causing violent ethnic clashes 
at the last stage of the colonial period. The clashes resulted in the collapse of the 
Tutsi-led political system and the massive outflow of Tutsi refugees to neighboring 
countries.15 It was their second generation who organized a Tutsi-led rebel group, 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and invaded the homeland in 1990. Ethnic antagonism 
in the civil war finally resulted in mass killing, in which at least 500,000 Tutsis were 
slaughtered in 1994 (Straus 2006). The war came to an end with the RPF’s total victory, 
and consequently massive number of Tutsi refugees, who had been obliged to stay 
abroad for decades, returned to the homeland. 
Winning the war, the RPF carried out a series of radical interventions in lands. 
Firstly, the massive number of Tutsi returnees were provided with parcels for dwelling 
and cultivation. Under the policy called “land sharing” (Musahara and Huggins 2005), 
 Hutu inhabitants were ordered to give up a half of their lands and provide them to 
returnees without compensation. Secondly, women’s inheritance rights for land were 
officially recognized in 1999. This was a drastic change from Rwandan customary land 
tenure, in which women had virtually no rights regarding the inheritance of land. 
Thirdly, following the adoption of the new land law in 2005, Rwanda has made serious 
efforts forward land tenure reform (Sagashya 2012). The new land law, emphasizing 
rational and productive land use, made land registration obligatory.16 A policy of 
systematic land registration has been launched since the late 2000s with the help of 
international donors. As a consequence, the demarcation of land plots has been 
completed throughout the territory, and certificates had been distributed for about half 
of the plots as of June 2012.17 This makes Rwanda the first African country that has 
completed land registration throughout the territory. Positive effects of the land 
registration including increases in investment have been reported (Ali et al. 2011). 
With the policy providing lands for returnees, guaranteeing women’s land 
rights, and promoting the land registration, will Rwanda successfully establish land 
tenure security and reduce land conflicts? The effects of the land registration should be 
deliberately examined taking the whole background information into account. Three 
points are particularly important in this regard. The first one is related to the 
 arrangement of registration. In Rwanda, registering a land plot under the name of an 
extended family member is officially recognized. Such a system of registration has 
enabled the postponement of dealing with the problem of inheritance among family 
members that is yet to be completed or they have disputes over the division. Without 
this arrangement, it is certain that an innumerable number of land conflicts would have 
erupted, as contention about inheritance among family members is the most frequent 
pattern of Rwandan land dispute (Lankhorst and Veldman 2009). However, this 
arrangement may exert an unintended effect in combination with another regulation, 
namely that prohibiting dividing land that is equivalent to or less than 1ha.18 This 
regulation makes the official division of land very difficult because the majority of land 
parcels are already less than 1ha.19 As it is virtually impossible to ban farmers from 
dividing their lands for inheritance, the division will surely continue informally. 
Consequently, the gap between the registered records and the reality of land tenure will 
be widened. Over time, the informally divided land plots may turn into something 
similar to the previous customary lands, in which land conflicts among right holders 
would be quite likely to break out. It may be unlikely that land registration contributes 
to reducing land disputes among family members. 
Secondly, the hegemonic nature of the state-society relationship did not change 
 in comparison with the previous regime. The victory of the RPF in 1994 led to the 
collapse of the Hutu-led regime and the establishment of the Tutsi-led regime. Although 
the RPF government introduced democratic political institutions, their rule has been 
generally considered as authoritarian.20 With regard to land, such a characteristic is well 
reflected in the policy of land consolidation, which is defined as ‘a procedure of putting 
together small lots of land in order to manage the land and use it in an efficient uniform 
manner so that the land may give more productivity (sic),’21 Under this policy, farmers 
are requested to plant the same crops, such as maize and rice, in designated areas. 
Although the policy may be advantageous for farmers possessing relatively large plots, 
those who have only a tiny plot tend to prefer to cultivate a variety of products for 
subsistence. However, their demands to plant crops that they want have always been 
rejected. Despite the official statement that it is local farmers who choose the crops to 
be planted, agricultural officers in the local administration determine them and give no 
other choice to farmers.  
The third point is connected to the Rwandan political stability. While the “land 
sharing” policy was radical and coercive, it has not triggered massive resistances to date. 
The fundamental reason that Hutu inhabitants have accepted the policy is that the RPF’s 
rule has been strong enough to enforce it. Based on military might, the former rebel 
 group has maintained a virtual monopoly of the state power in the post-conflict period 
and has so far succeeded in suppressing the discontents (Reyntjens 2011; Beswick 
2010). Although the returnees’ land rights were officially recognized by the 2005 land 
law and through the process of registration, they are essentially fragile in the sense that 
they are basically underpinned by the RPF’s coercive power. It is foreseeable that 
resentment of the Hutu farmers will erupt in the future whenever the RPF rule is 
destabilized. Property rights guaranteed by enforcement are fundamentally fragile.  
Rwanda’s post-conflict land policies such as the provision of land for returnees 
and the land registration agree with the international trends. Securing land rights for 
returnees has been strongly emphasized in the recent literature on peace-building.22 
There is also no doubt that land registration is one of the most effective tools to ensure 
land rights. However, historical backgrounds should be taken into account for the deep 
understanding of a policy. The case study clearly shows that Rwanda’s recent land 
policies have been considerably framed following the historical path. The policy of 
“land sharing” was adopted exactly because the RPF has the same ethnic affiliation with 
the Tutsi returnees and it won the war. In this context, one may speculate that the RPF 
took advantage of the new land law and the land registration to formalize returnees’ land 
rights. While it is difficult to prove such a speculation, the political context is easily 
 readable in Rwanda’s post-conflict land policies. 
Rwanda is not a special case. As political philosophers including Hobbes and 
Locke have argued, property rights need to be endorsed and protected by political 
authorities, which is, in the contemporary world, the state. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that property rights tend to be fragile when political order is unstable and that they tend 
to be biased in favor of state power holders.23 In other words, the stability of property 
rights depends essentially on the nature of the state-society relationship. Post-conflict 
Rwanda has so far ensured land rights in building a strong state capable of imposing 
rules on society. What is unclear, however, is how far such a rule, based on military 
power and enforcement, will be sustainable. The long-term stability of property rights 
would require a sustainable state-society relationship, in which political actors share the 
rule in order that political power struggles would not turn into serious political violence. 
The real challenge for Rwanda, therefore, will be to transform the nature of the 
state-society relationship so as to ensure long-term political stability. 
 
6 For the land tenure security in Africa 
Since the end of 19th century, when modern states were established in Africa by 
European powers, Africans have made tremendous efforts to transform the imposed 
 states into their own states, with which they can enter into the social contract. After 
more than one hundred years since then, both African states and the societies have 
considerably changed. On the one hand, independence and democratization after the end 
of the Cold War have made African states more responsive to societies. As a result, 
official land policies have shifted from spoliation to the protection of Africans’ rights. 
On the other hand, in stark contrast with the African societies one hundred years ago, it 
is totally impossible today to generalize about them being land abundant. Due to various 
reasons including rapid population growth, frequent outbreaks of armed conflict, and 
the rising market pressure caused by the heightened demand for foods and bio-energies, 
African land has become increasingly scarce. 
While independence and democratization have contributed to the normalization 
of the African state-society relationship, land tenure security has not been ensured for 
many Africans, particularly for small-scale farmers. Rather, because of the eruption of 
land conflicts and enormous land grabs in rural areas (Anseeuw and Alden 2010; 
Deininger and Byerlee 2011), their land tenure security tends to be more jeopardized 
than ever. To tackle the crises, it is of course important to take legal and institutional 
measures including the enactment of appropriate land laws and the promotion of land 
registration, for which the international community should provide assistance. However, 
 it should be reminded that, as this chapter shows, the long-term security of land and 
property rights requires a sustainable state-society relationship. Considering Africa’s 
turbulent past, which is filled with severe experiences such as colonization, dictatorship, 
and a series of armed conflicts, a long period of time might be needed before political 
actors agree to prevent internal violence, and until people really feel that their land 
rights are secured. 
Notes 
1 The focus of this chapter is on Sub-Saharan Africa. Hereinafter, “Africa” refers 
substantially to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2 Article 22 of the Covenant stressed this point, in stipulating, “there should be 
applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples 
(indigenous people in colonies, by the author) form a sacred trust of civilisation 
and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this 
Covenant.” 
3 The term White Highlands refers to an area located in the uplands in central Kenya. 
Because of good soil and temperate weather conditions, the British East Africa 
colony, founded in 1905, encouraged British immigration into the area. 
4 King Leopold’s atrocity in the Congo was fiercely denounced in the UK and the 
 US in the beginning of the 20th Century (Morel 1906). 
5 On legal pluralism, see for example Moore (1973) and Griffiths (1986). 
6 One of the landmarks was the “Declaration on the granting of independence to 
colonial countries and peoples,” a resolution adopted by the United Nation’s 
General Assembly at its 15th Session on 14th December 1960 (A/RES/1514(XV)). 
7 South Africa’s independence in 1910 exerted no influence on the colonial nature of 
the country. It rather accelerated the racial segregation and thus resulted in the 
enactment of the Native Land Act in 1913. It was only after the abolition of the 
Apartheid policy that the country initiated the land reform. 
8 On this point, see for example Africa Watch (1993) and Hornsby (2012). 
9 As a symbol of oppression, African new leaders were eager to deny, at least 
verbally, the colonial state and its administration system.  
10 The recent surge of land right reform has been marked not only in Africa; rather, it 
is a world-wide phenomenon (Boras Jr. et al. 2007, Lipton 2009). 
11 It should also be noticed that the UK government’s virtual refusal of assistance for 
land reform was an important background of this policy change. 
12 In 2008, the average population density in 48 African countries was 33.8 persons 
per square kilometer, while the figures considerably vary from Mauritius (622 
 persons) to Namibia (2.6 persons). The number might be considered to be modest, 
as it is not far from that in Europe in 18th century. The average ratio of population 
to arable land in the same African countries in the same year was, however, 
considerably high, as it amounted to 395.4 persons per square kilometer (calculated 
from data in World Bank 2011). Africa can no longer be generalized as a 
land-abundant continent. 
13 As a recent attempt of this kind, see Holden et al. (2013). 
14 As to the Rwandan ethnic groups and their transformation, see Newbury (1988). 
15 This political process has been referred to as the “social revolution”. See 
Lemarchand (1970) for details. 
16 Organic Law No.08/2005 of 14/07/2005 Determining the Use and Management of 
Land in Rwanda, article 30. See Pottier (2006) for an assessment of the law. 
17 Interview with the Deputy Director-General of the Rwanda National Resource 
Authority on 1st October 2012. 
18 Article 20 of the 2005 land law. 
19 According to official statistics, the average farmland per household was 0.76ha; the 
average number of farm fields per household was four; and the proportion of farm 
households owning more than 1ha accounted for 20% (Republic of Rwanda 2010: 
 36). 
20 International assessments such as the “Freedom in the World” and the “Worldwide 
Governance Indicators” have continuously pointed out that political rights and civil 
liberties have been tightly restricted in Rwanda. See their website for details. 
21 Article 2 of the 2005 land law. 
22 See the Pinheiro Principles (UN 2005) as well as Leckie (2008). 
23 This is what Hobbes described in his classical work, Leviathan, particularly in 
chapters 15 and 24. On this point, see also Fitzpatrick (2006). 
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